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Abstract Collaborative filtering (CF) is a technique com-
monly used for personalized recommendation and Web ser-
vice quality-of-service (QoS) prediction. However, CF is vul-
nerable to shilling attackers who inject fake user profiles into 
the system. In this paper, we first present the shilling attack 
problem on CF-based QoS recommender systems for Web 
services. Then, a robust CF recommendation approach is pro-
posed from a user similarity perspective to enhance the resis-
tance of the recommender systems to the shilling attack. In 
the approach, the generally used similarity measures are an-
alyzed, and the DegSim (the degree of similarities with top 
k neighbors) with those measures is selected for grouping 
and weighting the users. Then, the weights are used to cal-
culate the service similarities/diﬀerences and predictions. We 
analyzed and evaluated our algorithms using WS-DREAM 
and Movielens datasets. The experimental results demon-
strate that shilling attacks influence the prediction of QoS 
values, and our proposed features and algorithms achieve a 
higher degree of robustness against shilling attacks than the 
typical CF algorithms.
Keywords collaborative filtering, service recommendation, 
system robustness, shilling attack
1 Introduction
Personalized recommender systems have been widely used
to address information overload, including that in applica-
tions such as service selection, service discovery, and cloud
deployment [1]. Collaborative filtering (CF) is a technique
commonly used for recommendation [2–4]. CF recommender
systems, whether user-based or item-based CF, are vulnerable
to shilling attacks [5–8].
Shilling attacks are also a potential problem for QoS-based
Web service recommender systems. Shilling attackers inject
malicious performance values for Web services to recom-
mender systems to manipulate Web service recommenda-
tions. In these systems, a higher QoS value of a Web service
implies a higher recommendation probability. The most com-
monly used QoS features in the systems are response time
and throughput capacity [3]. Similar to predicting ratings in
movie and ecommerce recommender systems, the main task
of the service recommender systems is to predict the QoS val-
ues such as response time and throughput values according to
historical data of service invocations by users. Therefore, the
CF-based Web service recommender systems are also suscep-
tible to shilling attackers who inject fake users.
Shilling attack detection and robust attack-resistant CF
have attracted significant attention in recent years. For de-
tection, supervised learning-based detection systems using
several user features [9–11], unsupervised detection based
2on clustering algorithms [12,13], and semi-supervised detec-
tion using both labeled and unlabeled data [14,15] are avail-
able. For robust attack-resistant CF, trust-aware CF based on
constructing a user trust model [16,17] and item anomaly
detection-based robust CF [18] are available. However, re-
cent research on the shilling attacks in service recommender
systems is inadequate.
The contributions of this paper are threefold: 1) The
shilling attack problem in QoS-based Web service recom-
mendation is presented; 2) a robust CF approach is proposed
from the similarity perspective (None of the similarity irrel-
evant features are used in our approach); 3) random shilling
attacks are injected to recommender systems to demonstrate
how the predictions of typical item-based CF algorithms are
influenced by attacks; then, these influences are compared
with those on our proposed algorithms.
In this paper, we present an approach that utilizes the dis-
tributions of user similarities such as interest similarity and
QoS similarity to determine the relative weights of the users,
thereby distinguishing fake users from genuine ones. Our
proposed approach follows three key steps: (1) The character-
istics of the four most commonly used similarity measures are
analyzed. (2) Features are extracted from the DegSim (Degree
of similarities with top k neighbors) with those measures. (3)
Users’ weights calculated by a clustering algorithm with the
features are combined to typical recommendation algorithms
to predict the QoS values.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
shilling attack problems in CF-based Web service recommen-
dations. In Section 3, we propose a robust CF approach for
QoS-based service recommendations. Section 4 reports the
experiments and results on WS-DREAM (Distributed Relia-
bility Assessment Mechanism for Web Services) and Movie-
lens datasets to compare between the robustness of typical
item-based CF algorithms and our proposed algorithms. In
Section 5, we analyze the experimental results, the general
form of shilling attacks in service recommendation, and re-
lated work. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2 Identifying shilling attack problem in CF-
based Web service recommendation
In a typical CF for QoS-based service recommendation sce-
nario [1,3], there is one or more m × n matrices, which in-
cludes a list of m users (IP addresses), a list of n services,
and numerous QoS values, e.g., throughout. A QoS value qu,s
implies a type of performance when the user u invokes the
service s. The key step of CF for QoS-based service recom-
mendation is to extrapolate the unknown QoS values for dif-
ferent users.
2.1 Shilling attacks on CF-based service recommendation
A typical attack on a recommender system is to arrange for
a group of users to enter the system and vouch for certain
items. These users become shills, also called fake users [6].
Therefore, the attacks are called shilling attacks (or profile
injection attacks [19]).
User-based CF for service recommendation makes pre-
dictions by identifying peers with preference profiles; item-
based CF for QoS-based service recommendation looks for
services with similar profiles and makes predictions based on
peer services’ QoS values. It is feasible to identify which ser-
vices have better QoS values in the invocations by the target
segments of users; therefore, both user-based and item-based
CF for service recommendation are aﬀected by the attacks.
In this study, we focus on the random attack model to
demonstrate the shilling attack problem because it is a low
knowledge type of attack an attack whose execution does
not require much knowledge [6] and straightforwardly con-
structed and applied to manipulate the QoS predictions in
Web service recommender systems.
The random attack model for service recommendation is
designed with the following characteristics. There are three
sets of services in this attack model: a set of randomly se-
lected filler services (SF), a set of target services (ST ), and the
set of the other services (S).
SF : All the services in SF are assigned to random values
that are in line with a certain distribution.
ST : All the services in ST are assigned to the most optimum
value in the QoS matrix. It is convenient to obtain the value
owing to the openness of the system. For example, the most
optimum value of the response time is the smallest value in
the response time matrix.
S: All the other services in the service set S are signed as
Null, i.e., these services are not assigned to any values.
When an attacker injects fake users, the attack size and
filler size will be used to regulate the number of fake users
and the number of QoS values for the fake users. Attack size
is the percentage of fake users. Filler size is the percentage of
the filled ratings or QoS values for a fake user.
A schematic of a shilling attack in a QoS-based Web ser-
vice recommender system is shown in Fig. 1. There are two
fake users (users with fake locations) who will aﬀect the rec-
ommendation to user A. If there is no fake user in the sys-
3tem, the system will recommend Service 1 to user A because
the service has a shorter response time. However, after an
attacker injects the fake users, the system will recommend
Service 2 to user A. The location of the fake users appears in
the vicinity of that of user A; however, they are actually at
Location 2. Through spurious IPs, the fake users are treated
as users similar to user A, and fake response time values are
utilized to generate the recommendation for user A.
Fig. 1 Schematic of shilling attack in QoS-based Web service recom-
mender system
2.2 An example: Shilling attack on CF-based service rec-
ommendation
The CF for QoS-based Web service recommender systems
is susceptible to shilling attacks. For example, a platform
collects the entire realty information available on the oﬃ-
cial websites of real estate organizations. It ranks and recom-
mends services to users according to both the user demands
and the Web services’ QoS values. In the WS-DREAM Web
Service QoS Dataset, suppose a user wishes to reside in Puget
Sound and the corresponding recommendation list contains
two Web services, WSID 5703 (see century21northhomes
website) and WSID 5711 (see pjgoldhomes website)
(Table 1).
Table 1 An example of attacks on a QoS-based Web service recommender
system
Response time/s
Users
WS:5703 WS:5711
Average response time of all normal users (20 users) 0.103 0.0939
User 1: 128.119.41.210 (a fake user) 0.052 0.118
User 2: 128.111.52.64 (a fake user) 0.061 0.177
User 3: 128.112.139.80 (a fake user) 0.053 0.125
Average response time of all users (23 users) 0.096 0.101
Without any loss of generality, only the response time fea-
ture of the Web service is taken into consideration in the ex-
ample. Suppose there were 20 invocations for each service,
and the average response time value was calculated accord-
ing to the response time values in those invocations.
In this case, Service 5711 should be recommended first be-
cause its average response time (0.0939s) is smaller than that
of Service 5703 (0.103s).
As Table 1 depicts, after the attack (assume there are
three fake users, whose IP addresses are 128.119.41.210,
128.111.52.64, and 128.112.139.80), the average response
time of services 5703 and 5711 change from 0.103s and
0.939s to 0.096s and 0.100s, respectively.
Therefore, the shilling attack is eﬀective because the re-
sponse time of Web service 5703 becomes smaller than that
of Web service 5711 after the attack.
The example can be generalized to all types of QoS attacks
on CF Web service recommendation, such as random attack,
average attack [6], and bandwagon attack [20].
Moreover, the IP address in an invocation could be manip-
ulated. For example, as an important indicator of the QoS, the
response time may be related to the distance from the user to
the server of a Web service. Using a false IP, an attacker cre-
ates an illusion that an invocation at a distance from a service
can obtain a short response time. Thus, the shilling attack
would work eﬀectively in a QoS-based Web service recom-
mender system. In addition, the QoS values in a Web ser-
vice recommender system are generally remarkably sparse.
To solve the problem, a system can utilize the location-based
Web service recommendation method [21], in which inte-
grated QoS values of services in adjacent locations will be
treated as the QoS value of the service for this region so that
the illusion created by the attackers will severely aﬀect the
QoS of a service for the region and will result in biased rec-
ommendation.
3 A robust CF based on similarities for ser-
vice recommendation
Mehta et al. [22] determined that fake users are highly cor-
related to each other, and he proposed an algorithm based on
principal component analysis. Wang et al. [23] proposed an
approach to eliminate maliciousness among the peers based
on the neighbor similarity of peers in a group peer-to-peer
(P2P) ecommerce network. These studies inspired us to pro-
pose an approach based on user similarities.
In order to provide robust service recommendation, four
parts of work have been conducted (see Fig. 2).
Part 1: Analyze user similarity measures (Section 3.1).
Part 2: Extract features from the similarity perspective
4(Section 3.2).
Part 3: The features are used to figure out fake users and
reduce their weights; the weights are used with typical CF al-
gorithms to calculate service similarities/deviations and pre-
dict QoS values (Section 3.3).
Fig. 2 Procedures of the proposed robust CF approach
The robustness of recommender systems implies the capa-
bility to make recommendations notwithstanding biased rat-
ings [24].
3.1 User similarities
There are diﬀerent types of similarities between users in a
recommender system. In this section, we describe an ap-
proach for exploiting user similarities and features for detect-
ing fake users from a similarity perspective. Two types of user
similarities are investigated in particular: QoS similarity and
interest similarity.
There have been certain commonly used similarity com-
puting methods in recommender systems, such as Pear-
son correlation coeﬃcient, adjusted cosine, cosine, and
relevance-based methods [8,25–27]. The first three methods,
measured by how two users’ QoS values are similar or corre-
lated to each other, can be considered as QoS similarities.
They are more frequently used than the last one. The last
one, also named interest similarity, is measured by the pro-
file overlap [26], i.e., the number of services those have been
invoked by two specified users, which represents the extent
to which they share common interests in a specific set of ser-
vices.
Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, adjusted cosine similarity,
and cosine-based similarity between the QoS values of users
u and v are named Psn (u, v), AC (u, v), and Csn (u, v), respec-
tively.
Psn(u, v) =
∑
i∈S (u)∩S (v)(qu,i − qu)(qv,i − qv)
√∑
i∈S (u)∩S (v)(qu,i − qu)2
√∑
i∈S (u)∩S (v)(qv,i − qv)2
,
(1)
Ad jCsn(u, v) =
∑
i∈S (qu,i − Qu)(qv,i − Qv)
√
∑
i∈S (qu,i − Qu)2
√
∑
i∈S (qv,i − Qv)2
, (2)
Csn(u, v) =
∑
i∈S (qu,i · qv,i)
√∑
i∈S (qu,i)2
√∑
i∈S (qv,i)2
, (3)
where qu is the average of the u’s QoS values on the services
in S (u) ∩ S (v), that is, qu = ∑i∈S (u)∩S (v) qu,i/|S (u) ∩ S (v)|;
qv =
∑
i∈S (u)∩S (v) qv, j/|S (u) ∩ S (v)|; Qu = ∑i∈S (u) ru,i/|S (u)|
is the average of all known QoS values of user u; Qv =
∑
i∈S (v) qv,i/|S (v)|; |S (u)| ∩ |S (v)| is the set of services invoked
by both user u and user v.
The relevance-based similarity can be calculated by Jac-
card, measured by the fraction of shared services in the ser-
vices jointly invoked by both the users (see Formula 4). This
similarity between u and v is named Jcd (u, v).
Jcd(u, v) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
|S (u) ∩ S (v)|
|S (u) ∪ S (v)| , if (u  v);
1, if (u = v).
(4)
3.2 Analysis on DegSim based on diﬀerent similarities
To analyze the features of the similarities, we calculated the
mean of the DegSim [11] using Pearson correlation coeﬃ-
cient, adjusted cosine similarity, cosine, and relevance-based
similarity. This is because DegSim has been identified to
be eﬀective for fake users’ detection [10,28]. In a typical
DegSim, the k most similar neighbors are used to calculate
the mean Pearson correlation coeﬃcient similarity for each
user (Eq. (5)). In this paper, the DegSim with Pearson corre-
lation coeﬃcient similarity is named Prs_DegSim.
Prs_DegSimv =
∑k
u=1 Psn(u, v)
k
. (5)
Prs_DegSimv is the mean of the similarities of the k most sim-
ilar users of v. Psn(u, v) is the Pearson-correlation-coeﬃcient-
based similarity between u and v.
However, Prs_DegSim itself is not adequate to detect fake
users. For example, on Movielens 100k Dataset, under ran-
dom attacks, the Prs_DegSim values of normal and fake users
are shown in Fig. 3.
In these attacks, the attack sizes are 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%
and the filler sizes are 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%. The blue points
are normal users and the red points are fake ones.
5Normal and fake users cannot be classified with
Prs_DegSim values, as shown in Fig. 3. This could be the
reason why researchers use Prs_DegSim as well as RDMA
or other features [22,28] to detect fake users.
To further explore how user similarities help detect shilling
attacks, we incorporate other similarities in Subsection 3.1
into the DegSim calculation, namely, AC_DegSim (Eq. (6)),
Csn_DegSim (Eq. (7)), and Jcd_DegSim (Eq. (8)).
AC_DegSimv =
∑k
u=1 AC(u, v)
k
. (6)
Csn_DegSimv =
∑k
u=1 Csn(u, v)
k
. (7)
Jcd_DegSimv =
∑k
u=1 Jcd(u, v)
k
. (8)
The formulas are measured by the mean value of the ad-
justed cosine, cosine, and Jaccard similarities of the k most
similar users of v.
To show the corresponding values of the DegSims, similar
random shilling attacks are generated into Movielens 100K
Dataset with 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10% attack sizes and 1%, 3%,
5%, and 10% filler sizes.
We did not use WS-DREAM dataset for DegSim analysis
because it has all the QoS values in the matrix; however, in an
actual recommender system, the QoS matrix is generally very
sparse [1]. Movielens Dataset (10% density) derived from an
actual movie recommender system is suitable for analyzing
the DegSim values.
The values of AC_DegSim are similar to those
of Prs_DegSim; however, those of Csn_DegSim and
Jcd_DegSim are significantly diﬀerent, as shown in Fig.
4. The normal and fake users can be classified more con-
veniently with Csn_DegSim or Jcd_DegSim than with
Prs_DegSim or AC_DegSim.
Furthermore, the normal and fake users can be conve-
niently classified using (Csn_DegSim, Jcd_DegSim) points.
This is shown in Fig. 5, where the blue points represent nor-
mal users and the red points represent fake ones, for ran-
dom attacks with 5% attack size and 5% filler size. The re-
sults with other attack and filler sizes are similar to those in
Figs. 4 and 5.
3.3 CF approach based on the features from similarity per-
spective
There are two steps in this subsection: 1) identify fake users
based on the features extracted in Section 3.2, and 2) deacti-
vate the users in CF algorithms.
3.3.1 Identification of fake users
According to the results in Section 3.2, the points
(Jcd_DegSim, Csn_DegSim) of fake users are at a distance
from the expectation of the distribution. Moreover, the simi-
larities between fake users are higher than those between nor-
mal users, which will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3.
Thus, fake users can be clustered into a group using the
(Jcd_DegSim, Csn_DegSim) values.
If the users are in the attack group, their weights should
be exceedingly low; otherwise, the weights will be high. As
Fig. 3 Prs_DegSim values under attack. (a) Attack size=1%filler size=1%; (b) attack size=3%filler size=3%; (c) attack size=5%filler
size=5%; (d) attack size=10%filler size=10%
6Fig. 4 DegSim values under attacks (attack size = 5%, filler size = 5%). (a) Prs_DegSim; (b) AC_DegSim; (c) Csn_DegSim; (d) Jcd_DegSim
Fig. 5 Csn_DegSim and Jcd_DegSim under random attacks (attack
size=5%, filler size=5%)
the weighting problem is also a clustering related problem, a
particular type of algorithm can be used to group users, e.g.,
DBSCAN (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications
with Noise), OPTICS, and DENCLUE. In our approach, we
use DBSCAN [29,30] to group dense users as an example.
The pseudocode of the DBSCAN is shown as Algorithm 1.
The dataset D for the algorithm consists of users’
(Csn_DegSim, Jcd_DegSim) values. A heuristic method [30]
is used to determine the parameters eps and minpts dynam-
ically. The Euclidean distance is used to calculate the eps
neighborhood. Upon applying the DBSCAN algorithm, we
determined the fake users group to be a cluster; however, it is
challenging to cluster the normal ones in a group.
wu =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if (u ∈ S U);
1, if (u  S U).
(9)
Then, we can identify the suspicious user group using the
algorithms. The weight wu of user u can be calculated by
Eq. (9). SU is the set of suspicious users.
Algorithm 1 Density-based clustering algorithm
DBSCAN (D, eps, minpts)
{Cls = Null
for each unvisited point x in dataset D do
{ Mark x as visited
Neighboreps x = all points within x’s eps neighborhood
if sizeof (Neighboreps x) < minpts then
Make x as Noise
else
{Cls = next cluster
EXPCluster (x, Neighboreps x, Cls, eps,minpts)
}
}
}
EXPCluster (x, Neighboreps x, Cls, eps,minpts)
{ add x to cluster Cls
for each y in Neighboreps x
{ if y is not visited then
{mark y as visited
Neighborepsy = all points within y’s eps neighborhood
if sizeof (Neighborepsy) >= minpts then
Neighboreps x = Neighboreps x∪ Neighborepsy
if y is not yet member of any cluster then
add y to cluster Cls
}
}
}
3.3.2 Combine user weights in typical CF algorithms
Item-based CF [8] was proposed to compute the similarities
7between items and then to select the most similar items for
prediction. It functions by comparing items based on the pat-
tern of ratings across users. Adjusted cosine [8] and Slope-
One [31] are commonly used algorithms to calculate the sim-
ilarities (or diﬀerentials) between items and to make predic-
tions because they are reasonably accurate and conveniently
analyzed [32].
Thus, in this study, the users’ weights are incorpo-
rated with adjusted cosine-based CF (ACCF) and SlopeOne,
forming weighted ACCF (wACCF) and weighted SlopeOne
(wSlopeOne).
1) wCCF algorithm
• Step 1 Service similarity computing
In wACCF, the service similarities are calculated by
Eq. (10).
S imi, j =
∑
u∈U(i)∩U( j) (qu,i − qu)(qv,i − qv) × w2u
√∑
u∈U(i)∩U( j) (qu,i − qu)2
√∑
u∈U(i)∩U( j) (qv,i − qv)2
.
(10)
Here, U(i) is the set of users who have rated on service i,
qu is the average of user u’s QoS values, and wu is the weight
of user u.
• Step 2 QoS prediction
To predict a QoS value pu,i, the weighted sum is applied by
Eq. (11), which is the crucial step in CF algorithms.
Pu,i =
∑
j∈S (u)(S imi, j × qu, j)
∑
j∈S (u) S imi, j
. (11)
2) wSlopeOne algorithm
• Step 1 Service diﬀerential computing
For wSlopeOne, the diﬀerential of services i and j diﬀ i, j
is calculated by Eq. (12), which is the average diﬀerence be-
tween the QoS values of i and j:
di f fi, j =
∑
u∈S (i)∩S ( j)(qu,i − qu, j) × wu
|S (i) ∩ S ( j)| , (12)
where |S (i) ∩ S ( j)| is the cardinality of the set.
• Step 2 QoS prediction
The diﬀerentials of services are then used to predict the
QoS values (Eq. (13)).
pu,i =
∑
j∈S (u)(qu,i − du f fi, j)
|qu| . (13)
3.4 Computational complexity analysis
We suppose there are m users and n Web services in a recom-
mender system.
3.4.1 Complexity of wACCF and wSlopeOne
For a service, we need to calculate the service–service sim-
ilarities or deviations with all the n services in the training
set. The computational complexity of each similarity or de-
viation computation is O(l); l is the number of intersecting
users between the two services. The parameter l is ordinar-
ily a small number because the QoS matrix is generally a
sparse matrix. There are n services; therefore, the time com-
plexity of service–service similarity or deviation computation
is O(l × n2) = O(n2). After oﬄine similarity/deviation com-
putation, the time complexity of the prediction computation
for each active user on each service is O(k) because k ser-
vices will be used to predict the values. The parameter k is
the number of similar services and is generally a small num-
ber. In the prediction procedure, we need to predict at most
n services for each user; therefore, the time complexity of
the prediction computation for each user is O(kn). There are
m users in total; therefore, the time complexity of prediction
computation is O(kmn). The computational complexities of
both wACCF and wSlopeOne are O(n2 + mn).
3.4.2 Complexity of prediction for an active user
For the computational complexity of users’ interesting sim-
ilarities and rating similarities, the complexity is O(m2). For
the DBSCAN algorithm, with the use of an accelerating index
structure, the computational complexity is O(m log m); other-
wise, the computational complexity is O(m2). As discussed in
3.4.1, the computational complexity of service–service simi-
larities or deviations is O(n2). All these computations can be
conducted oﬄine. They require at most O(m2 + n2) memory.
For an active user, the computational complexity of the
prediction of each value is O(k). The parameter k is the num-
ber of similar services. Therefore, the computational com-
plexities of the wACCF and wSlopeOne for an active user
are O(kn).
In the research, we intend to present that the shilling at-
tacks are a threat to QoS-based Web service recommenda-
tions and provide an approach from the user similarity per-
spective. The computational costs should be duly considered
if there are numerous users and Web services. A solution is
to calculate the users’ weights, similarities, and diﬀerentials
oﬄine and to predict the QoS values for active users online.
4 Experimental evaluation
This is to demonstrate that CF-based Web service recommen-
dation is influenced by shilling attacks and to evaluate the
robustness of the proposed algorithms. In the experiments,
we used two datasets: WS-DREAM [1,3,33–35] and Movie-
lens [25,36]. The main goal of WS-DREAM is to oﬀer Web
8service QoS data for Web service researchers. The dataset is
commonly used in QoS-based Web service recommendations
[33–35]. Movielens is also used in the evaluation of Web ser-
vice recommendations [37,38].
There are two service features in WS-DREAM dataset: re-
sponse time and throughput. It contains all the QoS values of
Web service invocations on 5,825 Web services by 339 ser-
vice users. The response time matrix is utilized in the experi-
ments. There are 1,974,675 response time QoS values (0–20)
from 339 users on 5,825 Web services.
Movielens 100K dataset includes 100,000 ratings (1–5)
from 943 users on 1,682 movies. Each user has at least 20
ratings.
To evaluate the algorithms based on the prediction of QoS
values, the WS-DREAM dataset is generally preprocessed to
have diﬀerent densities [1,35]. That is because the QoS ma-
trix is generally very sparse in an actual recommender sys-
tem [1,3,35]. The processed matrix in this paper has 10%
response time values randomly selected from 339 users on
1,000 Web services, and each user has at least 20 invocations
on diﬀerent services. It has a density similar to that of Movie-
lens 100k dataset.
4.1 Metrics for evaluation
In the experiments, we use the mean absolute error (MAE
[24]) and predictionshift [5,6] metrics to examine the preci-
sion and shift of predictions as well as the PoU (proportions
of users influenced by attacks) to reveal the number of users’
hit ratios in their top n recommendation lists that are influ-
enced.
1) Predictionshift is for the deviation between the predic-
tions before and after the attacks (Eq. (14)).
Predshi f t =
∑
i∈I
∑
u∈U
|pu,i − pu,i|
|U | × |I| , (14)
where the pu,i and p’u,i are the predictions before and after
the attacks, respectively.
2) PoU is the proportion of users whose hit ratio values are
influenced under the attacks. The hit ratio can be calculated
by the ratio of the services in the m recommendation list that
are actually in the users’ n most favorite services (in test set).
PoU can be calculated by using Eqs. (15) and (16).
Pouu =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if (H′u = Hu);
1, if (H′u  Hu).
(15)
PoU =
∑
u∈U
PoUu. (16)
Here, Hu and H′u are the hit ratio values of the users in the test
set U before and after the attacks, respectively.
3) MAE is a metric for the precision of the predictions,
which is measured by the deviation of the predictions [24]
from the true ratings or QoS values.
The lower these metrics are, the more eﬀective the ap-
proach is. Because the critical criterion for robust recom-
mender systems is to reduce the influence of fake user pro-
files rather than to improve the precision of predictions, we
only used MAE to demonstrate the accuracy of the predicted
ratings or QoS values and did not use other measurements to
evaluate the accuracy. Meanwhile, we adopted two essential
measurements for robust recommendations: the shift of pre-
diction and the proportions of users who are influenced by
attacks.
4.2 Experimental methodology
For the selection of k neighbors, a large k would generate ex-
cessive noise for users with high correlations, while a small
k would result in ineﬀective predictions for those with low
correlations [39]. In the experiments, we select the value of k
from 10, 20, and 30 to execute the ACCK, wACCK, Slope-
One, and wSlopeOne algorithms.
To test the robustness of the proposed algorithms, the at-
tack model, attack size, and filler size were set as below:
• Attack model: random attack because it requires little
knowledge [6,20];
• Attack size: the percentage of attack profiles, valued at
5% and 10%;
• Filler size: the percentage of the filler ratings (IF) in the
attacks, valued at 5% and 10%.
Attack size and filler size are measured as percentages of
the pre-attack user count and of the service count, respec-
tively. The sizes are set to 5% and 10% because these values
are typical in shilling attacks [5,6,40].
According to the random attack model’s description in
Subsection 2.1, the settings of the fake users’ profiles for the
response time QoS dataset are as follows:
• SF : the randomly filling Web services are randomly val-
ued by its mean μ = 2.05 and variance σ2 = 2.03;
• ST : the target services are assigned to qbest; in the ex-
periments, 10, 20, 30, and 50 services are randomly se-
lected as the target services;
• S: all other services are assigned to null.
9Here, the values of the mean and variance are calculated
using the training set of WS-DREAM dataset.
According to the random attack model’s description [6]
and the values in Movielens, the settings of the attack pro-
files for Movielens are as follows:
• IF : the randomly filling items are assigned to random
values with its mean at μ = 3.6 and variance at σ2 =
1.1;
• IT : the target items are assigned to rmax; in the experi-
ments, 10, 20, 30, and 50 items are randomly selected
as the target items;
• I : all other items are assigned to null.
Here, the values of the mean and variance are calculated
using the training set of Movielens. The numbers of target
items are set to 10, 20, 30, and 50, because of which 10 and
20 are generally used [7], and we wish to determine if the
prediction shift and hit shift will be influenced by the number
of target items.
The experimental procedure includes the following steps:
Step 1 To obtain Csn_Sim and Jcd_Sim matrices of users.
Step 2 To calculate their (Csn_DegSim, Jcd_DegSim) val-
ues.
Step 3 To compute the users’ weights using their (Csn_
DegSim, Jcd_DegSim) values and DBSCAN.
Step 4 To predict ratings or QoS values in Uitest using
ACCF and wACCF algorithms; comparing the predicted rat-
ings or QoS values with the actual values in Uitest to obtain
MAE, prediction shift, and PoU.
Step 5 To predict ratings or QoS values in Uitest apply-
ing SlopeOne and wSlopeOne algorithms; calculating MAE,
prediction shift, and PoU.
Step 6 To fill fake users’ profiles into the rating matrix
and respond-time QoS matrix with diﬀerent attack sizes and
filler sizes; then, repeat all the steps 50 times.
In the preprocessed WS-DREAM and Movielens test sets,
numerous services and items have only a few QoS values or
ratings. Numerous users have rated only a few service and
items as well. Thus, for the metric PoU, when calculating the
hit with the top n (from 5 to 40, interval is 5), we select only
the users who invoke more than n services or rated more than
n items.
4.3 The experimental results
4.3.1 Comparisons of prediction shift
To demonstrate how random shilling attacks influence the
predictions of QoS and ratings and the stability of the pro-
posed algorithms, the comparison results of prediction shift
are shown in Figs. 6–8.
Fig. 6 Prediction shift comparison with diﬀerent TI on Movielens
Fig. 7 Prediction shift comparison with diﬀerent attack sizes and filler sizes
on Movielens
Fig. 8 Prediction shift comparison with diﬀerent TI and number of neigh-
bors (k) on WS-DREAM
The experimental results demonstrate that 1) compared
with ACCF and SlopeOne, the predictions of wACCF and
wSlopeOne vary negligibly under attacks with diﬀerent num-
bers of target items; 2) the prediction shifts of SlopeOne are
higher than those of ACCF, which indicates that SlopeOne
is more vulnerable than ACCF on the prediction shift metric
under random attacks, as shown in Fig. 6.
The prediction shifts when the system undergoes random
attacks with diﬀerent attack sizes and filler sizes are shown
in Fig. 7. In these attacks, the number of target items is 20.
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The experimental results demonstrate that 1) the prediction
shift values of ACCF and SlopeOne are evidently higher than
those of wACCF and wSlopeOne when the system suﬀers
from attacks with diﬀerent attack sizes and filler sizes; 2) In
general, the prediction shift values of wACCF are less than
those of wSlopeOne.
The experimental results with WS-DREAM are similar to
those with Movielens, as shown in Fig. 8. The figure shows
the prediction shift with diﬀerent TI (TI = 10, 20, and 30) and
diﬀerent number of neighbors (k = 10, 20, and 30)
4.3.2 Comparisons of proportion of users influenced by at-
tacks
The manner in which hit values of PoU are influenced by ran-
dom attacks are shown in Figs. 9–11.
Fig. 9 PoU-value comparison with diﬀerent TI and diﬀerent Top n. (a) PoU
values with TI=10; (b) PoU values with TI=30; (c) PoU values with TI=50
The PoU values under random attack with 10, 30, and 50
target items are presented in Fig. 10. The values of wACCF
and wSlopeOne are apparently less than those of ACCF and
SlopeOne, and the PoU values generally increase with n and
TI.
The PoU values of ACCF are higher than those of Slope-
One, which indicates that ACCF is more vulnerable than
SlopeOne on the PoU metric under random attacks.
The PoU values with diﬀerent attack sizes and filler sizes
on the Movielens 100k Dataset are presented in Fig. 10. The
number of target items is 20 in the attacks. These PoU values
are computed for the users’ top 20 items. The figure shows
that 1) the PoU values of wACCF and wSlopeOne are appar-
ently less than those of ACCF and SlopeOne and 2) the PoU
values of wSlopeOne are less than those of wACCF.
Fig. 10 PoU values influenced by the attacks with diﬀerent attack sizes and
filler sizes on Movielens
The PoU values on WS-DREAM Dataset are presented in
Fig. 11. The number of target services is 30 in the attacks,
and the attack size and filler size are both 10%. The figure
shows that the PoU values of wACCF and wSlopeOne are
apparently less than those of ACCF and SlopeOne; however,
it is challenging to conclude which is more eﬀective between
wSlopeOne and wACCF, based on the results. The results
with WS-DREAM are negligibly diﬀerent from those with
Movielens.
Fig. 11 PoU values with TI = 30 on WS-DREAM
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4.3.3 Comparison of MAE values
The results of the MAE comparison between the WS-
DREAM and Movielens dataset are presented in Table 2. The
MAE values of ACCF and wACCF algorithms are approxi-
mately equal, while those of SlopeOne and wSlopeOne are
marginally diﬀerent. When the k in those kNN algorithms
increases, those MAE values decrease. The lower the MAE
value, the more eﬀectively the algorithm predicts. The results
are consistent with the research [39]: MAE decreases sharply
as k varies from 10 to 30 with a step value of 10.
Table 2 MAE values with WS-DREAM (response time) and Movielens
datasets
K ACCF wACCF SlopeOne wSlopeOne
10 1.552 1.553 2.819 2.864
WS-DREAM 20 1.387 1.388 2.209 2.249
30 1.254 1.255 1.880 1.912
10 0.739 0.737 1.061 1.049
Movielens 20 0.692 0.690 0.880 0.875
30 0.672 0.671 0.788 0.782
As the intention of a robust recommender system is to re-
duce the influence of bogus ratings rather than to improve
the precision of predictions, the shifts of the rating prediction
and PoU, rather than MAE, are the essential measures. Our al-
gorithms wACCF and wSlopeOne reduce the predictionshift
and PoU values under random attacks with comparable MAE
with ACCF and SlopeOne.
5 Analysis
5.1 Experimental analysis
As is apparent from the experimental results in Section 4, the
robustness of the proposed algorithms is of a higher degree
than that of typical algorithms with comparable MAE values.
Firstly, the proposed algorithms achieve stable QoS predic-
tions for the system under random shilling attacks. Secondly,
the proposed algorithms decrease the number/proportion of
users influenced by the attacks. Thirdly, the accuracy of the
proposed algorithms is comparable to those of typical CF al-
gorithms. That is, the approach has the capability to make sta-
ble recommendations notwithstanding bias ratings injected
with random attacks.
A likely reason for this is that the weights of the users are
not taken into consideration in the baseline approaches. That
is, the weights of the fake and normal users are similar.
For the prediction shift metric, 1) with the increase of the
number of target items and services, the prediction shift val-
ues are generally increasing; 2) with the increase in the attack
size and filler size, there is considerable variability in the pre-
diction values of SlopeOne; however, those of ACCF are sta-
ble; 3) the prediction values of wSlopeOne are more or less
higher than those of wACCF.
For the PoU values, 1) with the increase in the parameter
n, the values of all the four algorithms more or less increase;
2) the values of ACCF are more or less higher than those of
SlopeOne, and the values of wACCF are more or less higher
than those of wSlopeOne; 3) with the increase in TI, the trend
becomes increasingly apparent.
Therefore, for the prediction shift metric, wACCF and
ACCF outperform wSlopeOne and SlopeOne, respectively;
for the PoU values, wSlopeOne and SlopeOne outperform
wACCF and ACCF, respectively.
A likely reason is that the similarities among the services
are larger than the distances among the services in maintain-
ing prediction stability, while the distances among the ser-
vices are larger than the similarities among the services in
maintaining the hit stability.
In this experiment, we discussed the algorithm only un-
der random attack because it is inexpensive. For other types
of shilling attacks, the proposed approach can also reduce
their influence because the attacks can be considered as spe-
cial forms of random attacks as they also give ratings to ran-
domly selected services. The attacks are likely to enlarge the
deviation of the prediction of the QoS values and increase
the number of influenced users. However, they require higher
knowledge of the items and recommendation approaches of
the target systems. The cost of these types of attacks will be
high.
5.2 General attack profile and attack models
In this study, the random attack problem has been analyzed,
and the proposed approach can solve the problem. To specify
the shilling attack problem in CF-based services recommen-
dations, we present the general form of an attack profile based
on the research [9], as presented in Table 3.
1) SF is a set of randomly selected filler services sF1 ∼ sFm;
there are m QoS values (qsF1 ∼ qsFm) on these services;
2) S is a set of uninvoked services (s1 ∼ sn); there is no
QoS value on these services;
3) SS is a set of selected services (sS1 ∼ sSl ), which exhibit
certain relationships with the target services; there are l QoS
values (qsS1 ∼ qsSl ) on the services;
4) ST is a set of target services (sT1 ∼ sTp ); there are p QoS
values (qsT1 ∼ qsTp ) on the services.
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Table 3 General form of an attack profile in CF-based service recom-
mender system
SF S SS ST
Attack profile sF1 ∼ sFm s1 ∼ sn sS1 ∼ sSl sT1 ∼ sTp
Value qsF1 ∼ qsFm Null qsS1 ∼ qsSl qsT1 ∼ qsTp
Suppose that there are totally k services in a recommender
system; an attack profile consists of a k-dimensional vector
of QoS values, where k = |SF |+ |S|+ |SS |+ |ST | = m+n+ l+ p.
Diﬀerent selection strategies for SS and diﬀerent values for
the sets SF and SS form diﬀerent attack models, such as ran-
dom attack, average attack, bandwagon attack, and segment
attack models [6,20].
In this study, we discussed the algorithm only under ran-
dom attack because it is inexpensive. The proposed approach
can reduce the influences of other types of shilling attacks
also because the attacks can be considered as special forms
of random attack as they too inject biased QoS values to ran-
dom select services.
5.3 Feature analysis
In the study, the features from the similarity perspective
(Csn_DegSim and Jcd_DegSim) are used to identify fake
users injected by attackers with random attack and are fur-
ther used in weighting the users. The experimental results
in Section 4 demonstrate the robustness of the proposed al-
gorithms based on the features that have been improved.
To analyze why these features are beneficial to the ap-
proach, we observed their distributions. We observed that
both Csn_DegSim and Jcd_DegSim are likely to belong to
normal distributions, as is apparent from the histograms in
Fig. 12.
To test if the samples of Csn_DegSim and Jcd_DegSim be-
long to normal distributions, the following hypotheses are to
be tested by χ2 test.
H0: the data belong to a normal distribution.
H1: the data do not belong to a normal distribution.
The following procedures were adopted to test
Jcd_DegSim:
1) One hundred samples were randomly selected from gen-
uine users;
2) Maximum Likelihood Estimation was adopted to esti-
mate the mean μ and variance σ2;
3) The values of Jcd_DegSim were partitioned into k dis-
joint subintervals;
4) Compared χ2 statistic Q with the 1-α quantile of the χ2
distribution with k-3 degrees-of-freedom to determine if H0
should be accepted.
Here, we carried out the test at the level of significance α =
0.05. The procedures adopted to test Csn_DegSim are similar.
The results of the χ2 test demonstrate that the random sam-
ples of Jcd_DegSim and Csn_DegSim belong to normal distri-
butions with means μ1, μ2 and variances σ21, σ
2
2, respectively.
The parameter for the Jcd_DegSim values was denoted as X
Fig. 12 Histogram of DegSim values. (a) Prs_DegSim; (b) AC_DegSim; (c) Csn_DegSim; (d) Jcd_DegSim
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and that for the Csn_DegSim values was denoted as Y. By ob-
serving randomly selected samples of X and Y of fake users,
we observed the features |X-μ1| > 2σ1 and |Y-μ2| >2σ2. Be-
cause the probability P {|X-μ| >2σ} < 0.0456, the normal
and fake users could be classified more conveniently with
Jcd_DegSim or Csn_DegSim.
Furthermore, the point (Jcd_DegSim, Csn_DegSim) was
noted as (X, Y). Set Z =
√
X2 + Y2. The result of the χ2 test
demonstrated that the distribution of Z could be accepted to
be a normal distribution with mean μ3 and variance σ23. The
Z values of fake users had the feature |Z-μ3| > 3σ3. Because
P {|Z-μ3| > 3σ3} > P{μ3-3σ3 <Z<= μ3 + 3σ3} = 0.0026,
the points (Jcd_DegSim, Csn_DegSim) vary from the mean
by three times the standard deviation and can be regarded as
outliers.
Thus, from the similarity perspective, Csn_DegSim and
Jcd_DegSim features are selected to detect fake users in this
study.
5.4 Related work
A number of recent studies have focused on robust (or “trust-
aware”) CF. In the early stage, to improve the prediction ac-
curacy of recommender systems, O’Donovan and Smyth [16]
incorporate the trustworthiness of users into recommendation
approaches. Moreover, a trust-aware CF approach based on
“Web of trust” [41] is proposed to increase the coverage of
recommendation while preserving the quality of predictions,
particularly for new users. However, prediction accuracy and
coverage are not essential metrics for robust recommender
systems [32].
Subsequently, a few researchers [6,42,43] proposed trust-
aware CF approaches based on specific user features or ma-
trix factorization strategy. Despite the weak comparability to
those related work, the experimental results with Movielens
are provided in Section 4 for reference. The prediction shifts
of the studies [20,44] are approximately in the range of 0.1–
0.5; however, the shifts in this study are less than 0.1 in most
cases.
New approaches have been proposed to detect shilling at-
tacks in recent years, such as the fake user detection ap-
proaches via spectral clustering [13] and semi-supervised
learning [15,16], and the item anomaly detection approaches
using dynamic time interval segmentation technique [7,19].
Compared to these studies, our approach provides a perspec-
tive from similarity to solve the shilling attack problem and
can be considered as a reference for constructing a supervised
or semi-supervised classifier, or unsupervised clustering ap-
proaches in the detection of fake users for CF-based recom-
mender systems.
Moreover, the shilling attack was built on the Sybil attack
[45–49], which has been studied in the security literature.
The researchers observed that the attacks demonstrate the ca-
pability to severely distort recommendation results [48,49].
To solve the problem, DSybil [48] and RobuRec [49] were
proposed based on suﬃcient information and overwhelming
condition. RobuRec is suitable for the recommenders with
general scoring systems, whereas Dsybil is suitable only for
binary feedback systems. In RobuRec, the item trust is cal-
culated from a mean value of specified ratings on the item;
then, the threshold values in both the upper and lower bound-
aries are set up to block those malicious ratings, which are
outside the boundaries. DSybil and RobuRec are suitable for
recommending products such as movies, songs, and books.
For those products, the ratings depend on the users’ sub-
jective experience, and the mean value can be interpreted
as the users’ final agreement for each item. However, they
are unsuitable for QoS-based Web service recommendation
because the QoS values of Web services vary considerably
depending on the network conditions rather than relying on
the users’ subjective experience. It is challenging to find the
users’ agreement, suﬃcient information, and overwhelming
condition for each service.
Although the improvement of the proposed method is
marginal compared to certain available anti-attack methods
based on multi features of user profiles, the proposed method
achieves high capability to resist only the shilling attacks in
traditional service recommendation methods, based on user
similarities. Furthermore, the statistical characteristics of new
similarity measures demonstrate the capability to distinguish
normal and fake users eﬀectively. It provides new measures
for other researchers to combine the measures to the most re-
cent semi-supervised or active-learning-based anti-attack ap-
proaches.
6 Conclusion and future work
Generally, in collaborative recommender systems, biased
profile data conveniently sway recommendations toward in-
accurate results that serve the attacker’s objectives. In this
study, we have identified the shilling attack problem in QoS-
based Web service recommendation and provided an exam-
ple to demonstrate how fake users can eﬀectively attack ser-
vice recommender systems. Csn_DegSim and Jcd_DegSim
features from the similarity perspective are used to detect
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fake user group and weight them. Next, two user-weight-
based algorithms are proposed to calculate service similari-
ties/deviations and predict ratings. The experimental results
of this study demonstrate that 1) the predictions of QoS
values are influenced under attacks, even under the most
straightforward random attacks; 2) the most-used similarities
between users are demonstrated to be eﬀectively utilized to
detect fake users; 3) against a random attack, the proposed
algorithms achieve a higher degree of resistance than the typ-
ical item-based CF.
In this study, we conducted experiments only on the
response-time QoS matrix. More experimental studies on
other QoS properties (e.g., throughput) and more datasets
will be conducted in a future work. We discussed only the
algorithm under random attacks. The manner in which other
types of attacks (e.g., average and bandwagon attacks) and
obfuscated techniques distort QoS-based Web service rec-
ommendations will be studied. In the study on the proposed
approach, we did not take time into consideration; however,
time is an important factor because the distribution of users’
similarities is time-varied, and the distribution of the QoS
values of a service is also time-sensitive. We plan to conduct
more studies to construct a time-aware approach to resist var-
ious types of shilling attacks.
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